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OHIO UPHOLDS TRADITIONAL EXCEPTION
TO GENERAL RULE OF CORPORATE
SUCCESSOR NONLIABILITY
INTRODUCTION
In Welco Industries v. Applied Companies,' the Ohio Supreme Court was
again faced with the controversy of corporate successor liability.' The issue
was whether a successor corporation that purchases the assets of another
corporation may be held liable for the unassumed contractual obligations of
the predecessor under the mere continuation exception to corporate succes-
sor nonliability.3
In a decision with far-reaching implications for corporate acquisitions,
the Welco court declined to expand the "mere continuation" exception to
successor liability.4 The decision upholds the basic freedom of purchasers of
"going concern businesses" 5 to acquire assets for fair value without assuming
liabilities.6
The purpose of this Note is to carefully analyze the Ohio Supreme
Court's reasoning in Welco and its implications. Part II discusses corporate
1. 617 N.E.2d 1129 (Ohio 1993)
2. In 1987, the court decided Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Machine Co., 507 N.E.2d 331
(Ohio 1987). Although a products liability case, the court laid down the basic foundation for
corporate successor liability in Ohio. See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text for further
discussion of the Flaugher decision.
See 15 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§§ 7123-7123.07 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990 & Supp. 1994) (for a general discussion of the
doctrine of corporate successor liability).
3. Welco, 617 N.E. 2d at 1132. The doctrine of corporate successor liability in a cash-for-
assets purchase holds that a successor corporation is not responsible for the liabilities of the
predecessor corporation, subject to certain exceptions.
One such exception, the mere continuation exception, allows for successor liability where
the successor corporation is a "mere continuation" of the predecessor. Generally speaking,
this exception applies if there is a continuation of the corporate entity.
4.Id. at 1133.
5. A "going concern business" is defined as:
An enterprise which is being carried on as a whole, and with some particular object in
view. The term refers to an existing solvent business, which is being conducted in the
usual and ordinary way for which it was organized. When applied to a corporation, it
means that it continues to transact its ordinary business. A firm or corporation which,
though financially embarrassed, continues to transact its ordinary business.
City and County of Denver v. Denver Union Water Co., 246 U.S. 178 38 S. Ct. 278, 62 L.Ed.
649 (1918). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 691 (6th ed. 1990).
6. Brief for Appellant at 4, Welco Industries, Inc. v. Applied Companies, 617 N.E.2d 1129
(Ohio 1993)(No. 92-471). Hereinafter referred to as "Brief for Appellant".
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successor liability7 in general, and then focuses narrowly on the mere continu-
ation exception to successor nonliability. Part III breaks down the case itself,
presenting the facts, procedure, and reasoning of the majority and dissent.
Finally, Part IV analyzes the court's refusal to expand the mere continuation
exception, suggesting that had the court chosen to expand the the exception,
the advantages of a cash-for-assets acquisition in Ohio would have been lost.8
BACKGROUND
Under traditional rules of corporate liability, the successor corporation
is not liable for the unassumed debts and obligations of the predecessor cor-
poration.9 However, successor liability may vary depending upon the type of
acquisition involved. 10
7. The doctrine is commonly referred to as "corporate successor liability", but because the
general rule in a cash for assets purchase is that the successor corporation is not liable, this
Note will refer to the doctrine as "corporate successor nonliability."
8. For discussion of the advantages of a cash-for-asset acquisition, see infra notes 83-92
and accompanying text.
9. Howard L. Shecter, Acquiring Corporate Assets Without Successor Liability: Is It A
Myth?, 1986 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 137, 138-39.
The general rule of corporate successor liability has been -and in fact continues to be-
that where one company sells or otherwise transfers all of its assets to another company,
the acquiring company is not liable for the debts and liabilities of the selling company
. . . simply by virtue of its succession to the ownership of the assets of the selling
company.
Id.
The traditional rule developed within the context of corporate, contract, and property
law. It provided a balanced means of facilitating corporate acquisitions and promoting the
transferability of capital while protecting the interests of commercial creditors. By protecting
both the creditors of the predecessor and protecting the successor from unknown or contingent
liability, the rule offered fair and equitable treatment to parties involved in corporate
acquisitions. George L. Lenard, Products Liability of Successor Corporations: A Policy
Analysis, 58 IND. L. J. 677, 683 (1983).
See Timothy J. Murphy, A Policy Analysis of A Successor Corporation's Liability for its
Predecessor's Defective Products When the Successor Has Acquired the Predecessor's Assets
for Cash, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 815, 821 (1988) (for additional background on the rationale for
the traditional rule of corporate successor liability); see also John C. Dupee, Jr., Comment,
Acquisition of Goodwill: The Acid Test of Successor Liability, 53 ALB. L. REV. 475, 475
(1989); David M. Henry, Comment, Choice-of-Law in Minnesota Corporate Successor
Products Liability: Which Rule Is the "Better Rule"?, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 373, 376 (1985).
10. See BA Fox & Fox, CORPORATE AcQuISITIONS AND MERGERS §§ 23.01-.04 (1984).
There are three major types of corporate acquisition: (1) statutory merger or consolidation;
(2) purchase of the acquired corporation's stock; and (3) cash purchase of the acquired
corporation's assets. Id. If the corporate acquisition is the result of a statutory merger or
consolidation, the surviving corporation will usually be held to have assumed the liabilities
of its predecessor, which ceases to exist. 15 FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 7121.
If the corporate acquisition is through a cash purchase of the acquired corporation's
[Vol. 28:2
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Most jurisdictions recognize four exceptions to the general rule of
successor nonliability." The exceptions include: (1) the buyer expressly or
impliedly 2 agrees to assume such liability; 3 (2) the transaction amounts to a
de facto consolidation or merger; 4 (3) the buyer corporation is merely a con-
tinuation of the seller corporation; 5 or (4) the transaction is entered into
stock, the acquiring corporation does not directly assume the liabilities of the acquired
corporation. See Robert J. Yamin, The Achilles Heel of the Takeover: Nature and Scope of
Successor Corporation Products Liability in Asset Acquisition, 7 HARVARD J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 185, 213-214 (1984). However, as Yamin indicates, there is still an indirect assumption
of liabilities because the acquired corporation is still in existence and subject to liability. Id.
If the corporate acquisition is through a cash purchase of the acquired corporation's
assets, the general rule is that the successor corporation does not assume the present or
contingent liabilities of the predecessor. 15 FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 7122. As will be
seen, it is this general rule which the expanded mere continuation exception seeks to modify.
11. See, e.g., Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Machine Co., 507 N.E.2d 331, 334 (Ohio 1987).
Some jurisdictions recognize an additional exception allowing liability to be imposed if
inadequate consideration is paid by the successor corporation. 15 FLETCHER, supra note 2, §
7122. However, most jurisdictions include this as a factor in analyzing the de facto merger
exception or the mere-continuation exception. Id.
12. An implied assumption of liability means that "[a]bsent agreement by the successor
corporation, [the successor corporation's] conduct must manifest an intent to assume the tort
liability of its predecessor, or the equities must be sufficiently strong to impose that liability
on the successor corporation." Smith v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1446,
1449 (D. Md. 1988).
13. 15 FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 7122 & n.9. This exception can only be invoked when a
successor corporation makes an express or implied agreement to assume the predecessor
corporation's liabilities. See James W. Maxson, Case Comment, Nissen Corp. v. Miller:
Maryland Courts Reject the "Continuity of Enterprise" Doctrine, 54 OHIO ST. L. J. 261, 262
& n.8 (1993). The exception is applied in a fairly straight forward manner: if a successor
corporation agrees, either expressly or impliedly, to assume the liabilities of the predecessor
corporation, then it will be held responsible for any liability that arises after the dissolution
of the predecessor corporation. Id.
Whether a court finds an express or implied assumption of liabilities often depends
upon the interpretation of the purchase agreement between the predecessor and successor
corporations. See 15 FLETCHER, supra note 2, at §§ 7112, 7114-15, 7124. If the language in
the purchase agreement concerning the debts or liabilities assumed by the successor corporation
is vague, unclear, or too broad, courts have found an implied assumption of liability. See,
e.g., Bouton v. Litton Industries, 423 F.2d 643, 652 (3d Cir. 1970)(successor corporation
held liable where assumption of liabilities in transfer agreement was so broad as to constitute
an implied assumption of predecessor's tort liability for defective products).
14. 15 FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 7122 & n.11. Generally, the requirements of a de facto
merger have been stated as follows: (1) a continuity of enterprise, i.e., continuity of
predecessor's management personnel, location, and assets; (2) continuity of ownership, i.e.,
shareholders of predecessor corporation become shareholders of successor corporation; (3)
dissolution of predecessor corporation as soon as practically possible; and (4) an assumption
by the successor corporation of those liabilities ordinarily necessary for the uninterrupted
continuation of the predecessor's business operations. Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379
F. Supp. 797, 801 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
15. 15 FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 7122 & n.13. The common law elements of the mere
continuation exception include: (1) a continuation of the officers, directors and shareholders
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fraudulently for the purpose of escaping liability. 6 This note will focus on the
mere continuation exception.17
Traditional Mere Continuation Exception8
The traditional test focuses on the "continuation of the corporate entity9
rather than continuation of the business operation. ' 2° The primary elements
of continuation of the corporate entity include: (1) the use by the successor
corporation of the same name, location, and employees as the seller used; and
(2) a common identity of ownership and management. 21 The exception has
been narrowly construed to protect purchasers from unassumed liabilities.2
of the predecessor corporation in the successor corporation; (2) inadequacy of the consideration
given for the assets acquired; and (3) dissolution of the predecessor corporation in either fact
or law. Jackson v. Diamond Trucking Co., 241 A.2d 471, 477 (N.J. Super. 1968). See infra
notes 18-39 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the mere continuation exception.
16. 15 FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 7122 & n.12 for discussion of cases applying the fraud
exception.
17. There generally has been little controversy concerning the application of the other
three exceptions. The mere continuation exception, however, has presented courts (as in
Welco) with the decision of whether to strictly apply or to expand the exception.
18. Throughout this note, the terms "theory," "test," "doctrine" and "exception" will be
used interchangeably when referring to mere continuation, as the terms vary among their use
by different jurisdictions and commentators.
19. "Entity" is defined as "[a]n organization or being that possesses separate existence for
tax purposes." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 532 (6th ed. 1990).
20. Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Machine Co., 507 N.E.2d 331, 336 (Ohio 1987); see also
15 FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 7122 & n.13.
The mere continuation exception is an equitable doctrine developed mainly to protect
creditor's claims against the predecessor corporation. See Murphy, supra note 9. In the
cases where this exception applies, in essence it is in the nature of a corporate reorganization,
rather than just a sale. See generally Groover v. West Coast Shipping Co., 479 F. Supp. 950
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); State ex rel. Donahue v. Perkins & Will Architects, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 29 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1980); J.F. Anderson Lumber Co. v. Myers, 206 N.W.2d 365 (Minn. 1973). For
further discussion of the difference between continuation of the corporate entity and
continuation of the business operation, see infra notes 21, 26-29 and accompanying text.
21. See Shecter, supra note 9, at 141. The mere continuation exception is "problematic of
application .. .because it has never been quite clear just in what sense a corporation must
continue in order to trigger the exception." Yamin, supra note 10, at 226. However, certain
essential elements of the exception can be ascertained from case law: (1) continuity of common
management, directors and officers; (2) continuity of common shareholders; and (3) only one
corporation in existence after the sale of the assets. See Murphy, supra note 9, at 820-21.
The policy behind the mere continuation exception is the same as that behind the de
facto merger exception in that a corporation should not be able to avoid liability simply due
to a change in its form and name. Both exceptions concern a situation where two corporations
combine as one final corporation. See Arthur Elevator Co. v. Grove, 236 N.W.2d 383, 391-
93 (Iowa 1975).
22. Flaugher, 507 N.E.2d at 33.
[Vol. 28:2
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The traditional rule was developed prior to the advent of modern prod-
ucts liability law and thus does not take into account the policies behind strict
tort liability.23 To overcome this obstacle, products liability plaintiffs have
sought to expand the mere continuation exception, as well as add an additional
"product line" exception to the traditional exceptions discussed above.24
Expanded Mere- Continuation Theory2 5
Rather than focus solely on the continuation of management and own-
ership, the expanded mere continuation theory would impose liability on a
successor corporation if: (1) there has been a basic continuity of the
predecessor's business and enterprise;2 6 and (2) if the predecessor effectively
ceased its business operations. 2  Although the Michigan Supreme Court
adopted this approach in Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Company,28 it
23. Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 878 (Mich. 1976). The traditional
mere continuation exception was developed historically in response to problems "in the areas
of creditors' protection .... tax assessments, or, in the case of the de facto merger, in the
context of shareholder rights." Id.; see also Hill, Products Liability of a Successor
Corporation-Acquisition of "Bad Will" with Good Will, 23 IDEA J. L. & TECH. 9, 10 (1982).
24. See Murphy, supra note 9.
25. This theory has also been referred to as the "continuity of enterprise" doctrine. See
Nathan E. Assor, Corporate Successor Liability Issues, C817 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 131, 136 (1993).
26. Assor, supra note 25, at 136. The focus of the expanded theory is on whether there is
substantial continuity of pretransaction and posttransaction business activities resulting from
the use of acquired assets. Id. at 136. Factors to consider include: retention of the same
employees, retention of the same supervisory personnel, retention of the same production
facilities in the same physical location, production of the same product, retention of the same
name, continuity of the general business operations, and whether the successor holds itself
out as the continuation of the previous enterprise. Id.
This approach differs from the traditional exception which focuses on the existence
and continuation of the corporate entity rather than on the continuation of its business
operations. See W. Edward Sell, Successor Corporation's Liability for Defective Products
of Its Transferor - The Product Line Exception, 4 J. L. & COM. 65, 68 (1984). Proponents of
expanding the mere continuation exception argue that the traditional approach within a products
liability context places unwarranted emphasis on the form of a particular corporate transaction
which, to the consumer, is largely irrelevant. See id. at 76-78.
27. Assor, supra note 25, at 136. Courts have also stressed: (1) the importance of finding
that the seller has effectively ceased ordinary business operations or has been dissolved; and
(2) that the buyer has assumed the seller's ordinary business liabilities and obligations. See
Brown v. Economy Baler Co., 599 So. 2d 1, 1 (Ala. 1992); McCarthy v. Litton Industries,
Inc., 570 N.E.2d 1008, 1012-12 (Mass. 1991)(but indicating that Massachussetts has not been
forced with the issue of whether to adopt the doctrine).
28. 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976). Turner expanded the mere continuation exception. See
id. at 883-84. The Turner court held that successor liability will follow "where the totality of
the transaction demonstrates a basic continuity of the enterprise." Id. at 875. Under the
continuity of enterprise rule adopted in Turner, the following four factors make out a prima
facie case of successor liability:
Fall/Winter 1995]
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remains the only state to have done so.2 9
Product Line Exception
The California Supreme Court adopted the product line exception in Ray
v. Alad Corporation,3 ° Under this theory, a successor corporation which
continues to manufacture a predecessor's product line "assumes strict tort
liability for defects in units of the same product line ....""3 While New Jer-
sey, Pennsylvania and Washington have also adopted the product line excep-
1) There was basic continuity of the enterprise of the seller corporation, including,
apparently, a retention of key personnel, assets, general business operations, and even
the [predecessor's] name.
2)The seller corporation ceased ordinary business operations, liquidated, and
dissolved soon after distribution of consideration received from the buying corporation.
3) The purchasing corporation assumed those liabilities and obligations of the seller
ordinarily necessary for the continuation of the normal business operations of the seller
corporation.
4) The purchasing corporation held itself out to the world as the effective continuation
of the seller corporation.
Id. at 883-84. See also Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1154 (1st Cir. 1974). In Cyr,
the court, applying Hew Hampshire law, held that a successor corporation could be held
liable even where it had paid adequate consideration for its predecessor's assets, and where
there was no continuity of ownership interest. See id. at 1151-54. This decision expanded
the mere continuation exception by doing away with the traditional requirement of continuity
of ownership interest. See id.
29. "Eight states-Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Vermont and Wisconsin-have all declined to expand the mere continuation exception". David
B. Hunt, Note, Tort Law - Towards a Legislative Solution to the Successor Products Liability
Dilemma - Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 1989), 16 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 581, 585 n.14 (1990) (listing cases and their holdings in states that have declined to
adopt the expanded theory).
30. 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977). In Ray, the buyer had purchased the physical plant, inventories
of raw materials and finished goods, manufacturing equipment, trade name, goodwill, and
records of manufacturing designs from the seller and had continued the employment of the
factory personnel. The buyer also hired the seller's general manager as a consultant. In
addition, the buyer continued to manufacture the same line of products under the same name,
and held itself out to potential customers as the same enterprise. Id. at 5-6.
The California Supreme Court held that "a party which acquires a manufacturing
business and continues the output of its line of products under the circumstances here presented
assumes strict tort liability for defects in units of the same product line previously manufactured
and distributed by the entity from which the business was acquired." Id. at 11. The court
gave three reasons for its ruling: (1) the plaintiff's lack of remedy against the original
manufacturer; (2) the successor's ability to assume the predecessor's risk spreading role by
means of insurance and increasing product costs; and (3) essential fairness in requiring a
successor who benefits from a predecessor's goodwill to bear the predecessor's products
liability costs. Id. at 8-9.
31. Id. at 11.
[Vol. 28:2
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tion,32 most other states have not.33
Ohio Law
Ohio follows the traditional mere continuation exception to successor
liability.34 In Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Machine Company,35 a products
liability case,36 the Ohio Supreme Court37 rejected the plaintiff's arguments
that either the expanded mere continuation exception or the product line ex-
ception were applicable to the case. 38 The court concluded that if corporate
liability were to be expanded in Ohio, it would require legislative, not judi-
cial, action.
39
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Facts
On February 16, 1988, Welco Industries," filed a breach of contract
suit against Applied Companies.4 ' On March 30, 1988, Vickers, Incorpo-
32. See Ramirez v. Amsted Indus. Inc., 431 A.2d 811,819 (N.J. 1981); Dawejko v. Jorgensen
Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106, 110 (Pa. 1981); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 689 P.2d 368, 388
(Wash. 1984).
33. See Hunt, supra note 29, at 586 n.18 for listing of cases and their holdings in states that
have declined to adopt the product line exception.
34. Welco, 617 N.E.2d 1129, 1132 (Ohio 1993).
35. 507 N.E.2d 331 (Ohio 1987).
36. The facts of Flaugher creating a successor corporate liability issue were as follows:
the plaintiff, Carla Flaugher, was injured on April 24, 1979, by a Conomatic screw machine
manufactured by Cone Automatic Machine Company in 1953. Id. at 333. In 1963, Cone
Automatic's assets were purchased by Pneumo Corporation. Id. Subsequently, Cone Automatic
was dissolved and a new Cone Automatic was formed by Pneumo as a dormant holding company
for the "Cone" name. Id.
37. The opinion was written by Justice Douglas, and was joined by Justices Moyer, C.J.,
Locher, Holmes, Wright and Brown, JJ. Justice Sweeney was the lone dissenter. Id. at 333,
338.
38. Id. at 336 ("It is obvious that even the expanded view of continuity has no application
under these facts."). See also id. at 337 ("We hold ... that the 'product line' exception to
corporate successor non-liability is a far-reaching and radical departure from traditional
principles, such that its adoption is a matter for the legislature rather than the courts.").
39. Id. As of the date Welco was heard, the Ohio General Assembly had taken no such
action. See Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1133.
40. Hereinafter "Welco".
41. Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1131. Hereinafter "Applied Companies" will be "Applied".
Applied Companies was a supplier under contract with the United States Department of
Defense to produce a number of mobile air-conditioning units, and was directed by that
department to use Welco Industries as a source of air compressors to be installed in
those units. In compliance with a purchase agreement, Welco . . . began supplying
compressors to Applied Companies .... At some point, Applied Companies became
convinced that quantities of the compressors were defective.
Fall/Winter 1995]
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rated 42 entered into a purchase agreement with Welco and its parent corpora-
tion, E.A.C. Industries, Inc.43 Vickers agreed to purchase certain Welco as-
sets, including the Welco name, physical plant, machinery, inventory, patents,
and goodwill." Vickers also assumed certain Welco liabilities, but specifi-
cally did not assume any rights or liabilities regarding the contractual arrange-
ments between Welco and Applied.45 This new corporate entity continued in
Welco Industries, Inc. v. Applied Companies, No. C-900801, 1992 WL 2566, at *1 (Ohio
App. I'Dist.). Ultimately, Applied refused to accept shipments from Welco, which prompted
the suit for breach of contract in which Welco sought approximately $1.4 million in damages.
Id.
On July 20, 1989, Applied counterclaimed against Welco and E.A.C. Industries, its
parent corporation, for compensation for its losses stemming, allegedly, from the breaches of
the agreement by Welco, in addition to compensatory damages for its losses as a result of
Welco's fraud, and punitive damages, costs and attorneys fees. Record at 14, 35, Welco (No.
92-47 1) [hereinafter "Record"].
42. Hereinafter "Vickers".
43. Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1131. Hereinafter "E.A.C. Industries, Inc." will be "EAC". It is
undisputed that Vickers acquired Welco by an agreement dated March 30, 1988, with EAC, a
New York corporation. Welco, 1992 WL 2566, at *1.
"The base purchase price, $8,324,542, was paid in cash by Vickers entirely to EAC."
Id. at *2. Vickers contends: (1) that the contract by which it acquired Welco was the result of
arms-length negotiations; and (2) that fair consideration was paid for the assets of Welco.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 6, at 2. To support these contentions, Vickers referred to
uncontested statements contained in an affidavit in support of the Motion for Summary
Judgment. Record at 124-26.
There were no shares of Vickers stock issued as part of the transaction. Vickers did
not purchase any shares of the sellers. Record at 125-26. These facts generally eliminate the
possible application of the de facto merger exception. See supra note 14 and accompanying
text for further discussion of the de facto merger exception.
Furthermore, the transaction was not a merger and did not in any way call for or
provide for the discontinuation or dissolution of the seller's corporation. Record at 125-26.
44. Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1131. Welco retained certain assets such as cash on hand other
than petty cash, stock records, and the right to collect under any insurance policies owned by
Welco or EAC. Id.
45. Id. The purchase agreement provided in part that Welco would retain:
all rights, if any, existing under the Applied Companies, Inc. Purchase Order Number
10001 dated March 3, 1986 with Welco, the Applied Companies, Inc. Purchase Order
Number 10030 dated August 19, 1986 with Welco, and the Applied Companies, Inc.
Purchase Order Number 10078 dated November 20, 1986 with Welco (collectively,
the 'Applied Contracts') and, to the extent related thereto, all inventories, accounts
receivable, claims, causes of action, rights of recovery and rights of setoff of any kind.
Id.
The agreement provided also that Welco would retain:
any liability or obligation relating to, based in whole or in part on events or conditions
occurring or existing in connection with, or arising out of, the Retained Assets,
including, without limitation, any claim, liability or obligation incurred in connection
with, or relating to, or arising out of, the Applied Contracts.
[Vol. 28:2
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the same line of business previously conducted by Welco under the new name
Vickers-Welco 6 Welco continued to exist as a shell corporation, 7 changing
its name to Wesche Electric.
48
On July 20, 1989, Applied counterclaimed against Welco, alleging
Welco had breached their contractual agreement.4 9 Applied added Vickers as
a counterclaim defendant, alleging Vickers was liable under a theory of suc-
cessor liability. 0
Procedural History
"Vickers moved to dismiss Applied's claims, asserting that it had spe-
cifically not assumed any obligations to Applied".5  The court treated the
motion as a motion for summary judgment.5 2 Applied argued that there were
issues of material fact regarding Vickers' liability as a successor corpora-
tion.
53
The Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas granted Vickers' Motion
for Summary Judgment.5 4 The First District Court of Appeals reversed the
Common Pleas Court, holding that there were issues of material fact regard-
46. Id. See also Brief for Appellee at 4, Welco Industries, Inc. v. Applied Companies, 617
N.E.2d 1129 (Ohio 1993) (No. 92-471) [hereinafter "Brief for Appellee]. Applied contended:
After purchasing Welco, Vickers operated the business in all respects as a continuation
of Welco. The goal in purchasing Welco was to buy an ongoing business which fit
into its strategic expansion plans .... Vickers-Welco [ continued in an identical line
of business, with the same employees, same supervisors and management performing
the exact same tasks and producing the exact same products as Welco.
Id.; but also see Brief for Appellant supra note 6, at 3. "Although some of the former
officers of Welco remained officers of the Welco Division of Vickers and continued to manage
its business, none of the former officers or directors of Sellers became officers or directors of
Vickers, itself." Id.
47. A "shell corporation" is "[a] corporate frame, containing few, if any, assets, kept alive
by required filings, generally for future use." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 343 (6th ed. 1990).
48. Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1131. For the sake of clarity, in this casenote, "Vickers" refers
both to Vickers before the transaction and to Vickers-Welco, and "Welco" refers only to the
predecessor corporation, later renamed Wesche Electric. Id. at 1131 n. 1.
49. Id. at 1131. Applied alleged Welco had breached the purchase agreement by supplying
them with products that were both defective and composed of parts not approved by the
government. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. See also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
52. Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1131. Because Vickers' motion was supported by an affidavit of
Lawrence J. Lyng, it was treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment. Brief for Appellant,
supra note 6, at 1.
53. Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1131. See also Brief for Appellee, supra note 46, at 8.
54. Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1131.
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ing Vickers' liability as a successor corporation.55 The case was then appealed
to the Ohio Supreme Court.
56
Reasoning of the Majority
The issue before the Ohio Supreme Court was "whether a stranger cor-
poration that purchases the assets of another corporation may be held liable
for the unassumed contractual obligations of the predecessor under a theory
of successor liability."57 The facts of the case specifically required the court
to "define the contours of the 'mere-continuation' exception to the general
rule of successor nonliability as it applies to claims sounding in contract.
5 8
In a five to two decision, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the decision
of the First District Court of Appeals. 9 The Majority held: (1) that the ex-
panded mere continuation theory was not applicable to this case; and (2) that,
under the traditional mere continuation exception, there was no genuine issue
of material fact as to whether Vickers was liable for the contractual liabilities
of Welco.
60
The Majority began its analysis discussing the recent expansion of the
mere continuation exception in products liability cases.6' The Majority exam-
ined both the "product line ' 62 and "continuity of enterprise"6 3 theories of
successor liability, but ultimately determined that, however valid the justifi-
cations for expanding liability in products cases, those justifications are not
55. Id. See also Welco, 1992 WL 2566, at *3. ("It is clear to us from this record that the
case does not lend itself to disposition under Civ.R. 56 but demands a plenary trial.").
56. Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1131.
57. Id. at 1132.
58. Id. Applied urged the court to apply an expanded version of the mere continuation
exception, thus calling on the court to re-examine the Flaugher decision, only this time in a
non-products liability context. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 46, at 11.
59. Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1135. Chief Justice Moyer wrote the majority opinion, joined by
Justices Wright, Brogan, Francis E. Sweeney, and Pfeifer. Id. Justice A. William Sweeney
wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Douglas. (James A. Brogan, Jr. of the Second
Appellate District sat for Justice Resnick). Id.
60. Id. at 1134-35. The Majority's refusal to expand the mere continuation exception will
be the focus of the analysis section of this Note. The court's ultimate decision to uphold the
trial court's grant of summary judgment was simply a factual analysis under the chosen
conclusion of law.
61. Id. at 1132-33. See supra notes 25-39 and accompanying text for discussion of the
recent expansion of the traditional exceptions to corporate successor liability. Note that the
Ohio Supreme Court in Flaugher expressly declined to expand the mere continuation exception,
even in the products liability arena.
62. Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1132. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text for discussion
of the "product line" theory of successor liability.
63. Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1133. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text for discussion
[Vol. 28:2
10
Akron Law Review, Vol. 28 [1995], Iss. 2, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol28/iss2/7
OHIO UPHOLDS TRADITIONAL EXCEPTION
applicable in non-products liability disputes.6 4
The Majority compared tort law, which is guided primarily by public
policy considerations, to contract law, which looks primarily to the intentions
of the parties. 6 The Majority concluded that to expand the mere continuation
exception in a contractual dispute "would virtually negate the difference
between an asset purchase and a stock purchase, ' 6 6 and result in an
"unnecessar[]y chill [to] the marketplace of corporate acquisitions. '67
of the expanded mere continuation exception, also called the "continuity of enterprise" doctrine.
Note that the Welco court refers to this theory as an "approach ... [which] relax[es] the
requirements of the 'mere continuation' exception." Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1133. Regardless
of the description used, all refer to the same theory.
64. Id. As the court discussed in Flaugher, the public policy grounds used to justify
expanding the mere continuation exception in products liability cases are similar to those
used to justify strict liability in tort. For example, manufacturers are in a better position than
consumers to bear the costs of the injuries their products cause, and they are in a unique
position to improve their products. Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Machine Co., 507 N.E.2d
331, 337 (Ohio 1987); see also Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1153-54 (1st Cir.
1974). Another factor is the benefit the acquiring corporation derives from the accumulated
goodwill of the seller corporation. Id. at 1154.
These policy considerations have convinced at least one court to conclude that in some
cases the consequences of a sale of assets should be no different from a de facto merger for
the purposes of liability. See Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 880
(Mich. 1976).
65. Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1133 (citing Victorson v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 335 N.E.2d
275, 277 (N.Y. 1975)). The Welco court explained: 't]he concerns for predictability and
free transferability in corporate acquisitions that led this court to decline to expand the test
for tort successor liability in Flaugher are even more compelling where the claim is in contract."
Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1133.
66. Id. The court further opined:
Courts would be forced to look beyond the surface of any asset purchase to determine
the extent of shared features between predecessor and successor in order to decide
whether liability should attach to contractual obligations that were explicitly excluded
from the transaction. The sale of a corporation's assets is an important tool in raising
liquid capital to pay off corporate debts.
Id.
67. Id. The court concluded:
For these reasons, we decline to expand the traditional exceptions to the general rule
of nonliability of successor corporations, and hold that a corporation that purchases
the assets of another corporation is not liable for the contractual liabilities of its
predecessor corporation unless . . . [one of the four traditional exceptions to successor
nonliability applies].
Id.; See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text for discussion of four traditional exceptions.
At this point, the Majority analyzed the facts under each of the four exceptions:
(1) "Vickers did not expressly or impliedly assume any contractual liability to Applied. The
purchase agreement expressly disclaimed both Welco's rights in its claim against Applied
and its potential liability in the counterclaim". Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1134. (2) There was no
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Reasoning of the Dissent
Justice A. William Sweeney dissented, 68 criticizing the Majority's
refusal to embrace the "expanded continuity of enterprise doctrine. ' 69 Rely-
ing on the reasons stated in Flaugher, Justice Sweeney agreed with the ratio-
nale that a purchase of assets, where significant features are shared between
buyer and seller, should be treated the same as a de facto merger. 70 Justice
Sweeney did not agree, however, with those cases requiring the dissolution of
the predecessor as a condition precedent to the application of the expanded
mere continuation exception. 7' The basis for Justice Sweeney's disagreement
was that to require dissolution as a condition precedent allows a successor
corporation to avoid liability simply by keeping a shell corporation in the
place of the predecessor.
7 2
evidence of a de facto merger. A de facto merger is a transaction that results in the dissolution
of the predecessor corporation and is in the nature of a total absorption of the previous business
into the successor. Id. citing Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Machine Co., 507 N.E.2d 331, 338
(Ohio 1987)(A.W. Sweeney, J., dissenting). (3) The asserted indicia of mere continuation
include Vickers-Welco having the same physical plant, employees, officers, and product line
as Welco had. The Welco court held these facts only relevant to the expanded mere continuation
and product line theories of successor liability, which they refused to adopt. Welco at 1134.
(4) There is no indication that either of the parties entered into the transactions with fraudulent
intent to escape liability. Id. "Indicia of fraud include inadequate consideration and lack of
good faith". Id. Applied never contended they were entitled to relief under this exception,
and the record failed to show that the $8.3 million purchase price was inadequate or the result
of unfair or fraudulent negotiations. Id.
68. Justice Sweeney was joined by Justice Douglas in his dissent. Id. at 1135 (Sweeny, J.,
dissenting).
69. Id. Justice A. William Sweeney did, however, concur with the Majority in that the
traditional exceptions of successor corporate liability are applicable to actions for breach of
contract. Id.
70. Id. This would most likely result in an implied assumption of liability. See supra
notes 12 & 13 and accompanying text.
71. Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1135 (Sweeny, J., dissenting). See supra note 28 and
accompanying text for discussion of cases requiring dissolution of predecessor.
72. Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1335 (Sweeny, J., dissenting). Justice Sweeney concluded that:
[l]iability should not be dependent upon such a facile maneuver. Instead, I would
measure whether the successor corporation was a continuation of its predecessor based
upon the following factors:
1. Continuity of management, personnel, physical location and assets;
2. Assumption of the ordinary business obligations and liabilities by the successor;
and
3. The successor's presentation of itself as the continuation of the predecessor.
. [Vol. 28:2
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ANALYSIS
In Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Machine Company,73 the Ohio Supreme
Court was presented with its first opportunity to confront the issue of corpo-
rate successor liability in a products liability case.7 4 Subsequent to the
Flaugher decision, Ohio appellate courts had been divided on whether the
Flaugher court adopted the traditional or the expanded mere continuation
exception. 75 Welco Industries v. Applied Companies,7 6 gave the court the op-
portunity to clarify the Flaugher decision in a non-products liability case."
Rejection of the Expanded Mere Continuation Theory
In Welco, the Ohio Supreme Court clearly embraced the traditional mere
continuation exception to corporate successor nonliability: "[h]aving de-
clined to adopt the expanded mere-continuation theory, we must decide
whether Applied may recover under the traditional mere-continuation
theory."
7 8
73. 507 N.E.2d 331 (Ohio 1987).
74. The Flaugher court, analyzing the facts of the case under the traditional rule of corporate
successor non-liability, expressly declined to adopt the product line theory as an additional
exception: "[w]e hold, therefore, that the 'product line' exception to corporate successor
non-liability is a far-reaching and radical departure from traditional principles, such that its
adoption is a matter for the legislature rather than the courts." Id. at 337. However, the
position of the Flaugher court is not quite so clear concerning whether or not they adopted
the traditional or expanded mere continuation exception: "[i]t is obvious that even the expanded
view has no application under these facts." Id. at 336. This indicates the court's analysis
under the expanded mere continuation exception, but does not indicate whether the court also
adopted the expanded mere continuation exception.
75. Davis v. Loopco Industries, No. 59594, 1992 WL 2590, at *3 (Ohio App. 8 Dist.). See
McGaw v. South Bend Lathe, Inc., 598 N.E.2d 18, 21 (Ohio Ct. App. 199 1)("The Ohio Supreme
Court in Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Machine Co .... declined to abandon the traditional
rule for the Ray product-line approach, but, by implication, adopted the 'expanded view of
continuity' that has emerged from the Cyr and Turner cases."); but see Erdy v. Columbus
Paraprofessional Inst., 599 N.E.2d 338, 341 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991)("[i]n Flaugher the Supreme
Court commented that the basis-of-continuity theory lies in the continuation of the corporate
entity not merely the continuation of the business operation."). Other courts have merged the
two tests. See, e.g., Bagin v. IRC Fibers Co., 593 N.E.2d 405, 407 (Ohio Ct. App.
199 1)("[i]ndicia of the continuation of the corporate entity would include the same employees,
a common name, the same product, [and] the same plant.").
76. 617 N.E.2d 1129 (Ohio 1993).
77. The Welco court expressly declined to adopt the expanded mere continuation exception
to corporate successor nonliability. The ruling was, however, narrow, as the court held: "we
decline to expand the traditional exceptions to the general rule of nonliability of successor
corporations, and hold that a corporation ... is not liable for the contractual liabilities of its
predecessor corporation unless . . . [one of the four traditional exceptions applies]." Id. at
1133 (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 1134.
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The court's refusal to adopt the expanded mere continuation exception
was in line with the majority of holdings in corporate successor liability
cases.79 Those courts that have adopted the expanded theory have done so
only in products liability cases.8" The reason given for expanding the mere
continuation exception in product liability disputes, as opposed to contract or
other types of disputes, is the influence of strong public policy considerations
present in strict liability tort law decisions. 8 I However, the policy consider-
ations which justify liability upon subsequent manufacturers of defective
products do not apply in Welco, a non-products liability case.82
Practical Implications of Expanding the Traditional Exception
If the court had adopted the expanded mere continuation theory of suc-
cessor liability, it would be nearly impossible for any person in Ohio to pur-
chase substantially all83 of the assets of a going concern business without
assuming all of the liabilities of that business.84 "If the courts were to hold that
79. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976); Cyr v. B.
Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974).
81. Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1133. One basis for the expansion of the mere continuation
doctrine in the products liability context is the policy that the economic burden of an injury
should be shifted away from the person upon whom it falls and onto someone else even
though that person was not at fault and did not cause the injury. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 1, at 6 (4th ed. 1971). In the products liability arena,
several policy considerations have been advanced to justify holding innocent successors and
others strictly liable for injuries of plaintiffs: (1) to shift the costs of injuries away from
innocent plaintiffs; (2) to place the costs of injuries on manufacturers who are continuing to
place the same products into the stream of commerce; and (3) to provide incentive for
improvements of defective products. See Brief for Appellant supra note 6, at 15.
82. Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1133. In Turner, the Supreme Court of Michigan, in introducing
the case, said: "[t]his is a product liability case first and foremost." 244 N.W.2d 873, 877.
The same could be said about Welco, only instead of product liability, Welco is a contract
case "first and foremost".
The majority of commentary on the subject of corporate successor liability concerns
the products liability arena. Welco was not a products liability case, and therefore, whether
the expanded mere continuation exception should be adopted in products liability cases is not
the focus of this analysis and will be discussed only in comparison.
83. A sale of "all or substantially all" of the corporation's property has been held to mean
virtually all of its assets. Thus, it has been held that a sale of the property of the corporation
which excluded cash, notes, accounts, bills receivable and real estate totalling more than
$200,000 was not a sale of all or substantially all the property and assets of the corporations
within the meaning of the statute. This result followed notwithstanding that the sale might,
for all practicable purposes, have terminated the corporation's customary operations as a
manufacturing concern. FRED A. SUMMER & DAVID A. ZAGORE, OHIO CORPORATION LAW
& PRACTICE § 10.2 (1991 Supp.); see also MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANNOTATED § 12.02,
at 1336 (3d. ed. 1993).
84. Brief for Appellant, supra note 6, at 6. See infra note 83 for reasons why.
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good faith purchasers who have paid fair consideration, in addition to paying
for the assets, must be responsible for all liabilities of the former owners,
including liabilities the parties have specifically excluded from the transac-
tion, then the advantages of the asset purchase transaction for a going business
would be destroyed in Ohio". 85
In addition, purchasers of going concern businesses may structure the
transaction as a purchase of assets, a purchase of shares or one of a variety of
tax-free reorganizations including mergers and consolidations." In a pur-
chase of assets, the buyer may pay cash87 for all or specified assets of the
selling entity and may assume some, all, or none of the liabilities of the busi-
ness.
88
85. Brief for Appellant, supra note 6, at 6. The common law rule in Ohio concerning a sale
of assets was that neither the directors nor a majority of the shareholders had the power to sell
or otherwise transfer all the property of a corporation if a single shareholder dissented.
However, statutes have since been enacted in every jurisdiction containing provisions that
govern the sale of assets by a corporation, thereby eliminating the common law veto power of
minority shareholders. SUMMER & ZAGORE, supra note 83, § 10.1. As far as director and
shareholder voting power is concerned, this change effectively makes a sale of assets similar
to a merger or consolidation. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.78 (Baldwin 1993). The
benefit derived is that the corporation seeking to enter into a sale of assets transaction is only
required under statute to have the affirmative vote of the shareholders who have enough
shares entitling them to exercise two-thirds of the voting power of the corporation; but, in
order to achieve this luxury, the corporation need not enter into a statutory merger or
consolidation as in the past, thus subjecting the purchasing corporation to statutory liability.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.76 (Baldwin 1993); SUMMER & ZAGORE, supra note 83, §
10.1I.
In addition,
[a]side from tax considerations, an asset purchase may be more attractive to the
[purchasing corporation] than other methods of structuring a transaction because the
buyer can pick and choose the specific assets desired and may avoid assuming some or
all of the debts and liabilities of the selling entity. An asset acquisition may be the
only practical method of purchasing the assets of a failing company or a company with
uncertain liabilities. If the buyer is forced to assume all liabilities, [however], the
purchase price may become ... uncertain.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 6, at 7.
An additional advantage to an asset purchase transaction is that the buyer can pay cash,
thus the purchase price is more reasonable and therefore more manageable and certain. If the
purchaser were to be held generally liable for the debts and liabilities of the predecessor
corporation, then one of the principal advantages of the asset purchase transaction would, in
most cases, be lost. Id.
The Welco Majority also discussed a further advantage of the asset purchase: "[t]he
sale of a corporation's assets is an important tool in raising liquid capital to pay off corporate
debts." Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1133.
86. See supra note 10 for discussion of mergers and consolidations, stock purchases, and
cash-for-assets purchases and the effect as to liability of each type of acquisition.
87. The consideration for the sale of assets may consist, in whole or in part, of money or
other property of any description. SUMMER & ZAGORE, supra note 83, § 10.1.
88. Brief for Appellant, supra note 6, at 7. See also SUMMER & ZAGORE, supra note 83, §
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Finally, one who purchases the assets of a going concern business in-
tends to preserve the good will of the business by continuing the business as
before. s9 If the successor corporation could be held liable for all unassumed
liabilities of the sellers merely because it continued in the same business, then
the asset purchase format for the acquisition of a going concern business will
not be chosen by "prudent Ohio purchasers." 90
CONCLUSION
In Welco Industries v. Applied Companies, the Ohio Supreme Court was
presented with the issue of whether to expand the mere continuation excep-
tion of corporate successor nonliability. The facts involved a contractual
claim, not a products liability dispute. The parties were both corporations
negotiating at arm's-length, not an innocent consumer against a powerful
corporation. The purchase agreement excluding liability was clear and con-
cise, not vague and subject to interpretation.
As a matter of both legal conclusion and factual analysis, the Welco court
reached the proper decision in refusing to expand the mere continuation ex-
ception. The Ohio Supreme Court's decision to uphold the traditional corpo-
rate successor liability doctrine has preserved the cash-for-assets transaction
as an effective means of corporate acquisition in Ohio.
DAVID R. LANGDON
10.4. Where a corporation sells or otherwise disposes of all or substantially all of its assets to
a bona fide purchaser, for value, and without notice of claims, the purchasing corporation
takes the property free of all liabilities. Id. However, the purchaser is liable to the extent that
the purchaser assumes the obligations of the selling corporation. Id.
89. Assor, supra note 25, at 136-37. For example, the successor corporation will often
operate the predecessor's business with the same facilities, the same employees, the same
management, and production of the same products. However, if the court were to expand
successor liability to depend on these factors, as Applied urged it to do, this would effectively
eliminate any preservation of good will in future corporate cash-for-asset acquisitions. See
Brief for Appellant, supra note 6, at 7.
90. Id. In addition, "[siellers who are burdened with uncertain or large debts would not be
able to realize fair value for their assets, which would increase the need for sellers to resort to
bankruptcy proceedings" instead of selling their assets to raise liquid capital to help pay for
the debts. Id. Welco, 617 N.E.2d at 1133.
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